George Curzon said that the great powers were still committed to the Organic Settlement Agreement, which concerns governance and non-interference in the affairs of the Christian, Orthodox, Druze and Muslim communities concerning the Beirut Vilayet of June 1861 and September 1864, adding that the rights granted to France in present-day Syria and parts of Turkey under Sykes-Picot , are incompatible with this agreement.  In May, Clayton Balfour stated that, in response to the indication that the agreement had been shaken, Picot had “allowed a significant revision to be necessary in light of the changes that have taken place in the situation since the development of the agreement”, but that he nevertheless considered that “the agreement respects the principle in any case”. The French elected Picot as French High Commissioner for the soon-to-be-occupied territory of Syria and Palestine. The British appointed Sykes political chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. On April 3, 1917, Sykes met Lloyd George, Curzon and Hankey to receive his instructions on the matter, namely to keep the French on their side as they pushed towards a British Palestine. First Sykes in early May, then by chance, Picot and Sykes visited the Hejaz together in May to discuss the agreement with Fayçal and Hussein. 166 Hussein was persuaded to accept a formula that the French of Syria would follow the same policy as the British in Baghdad. As Hussein believed that Baghdad would be part of the Arab state, he was finally satisfied with this. Subsequent reports from participants expressed doubts as to the exact nature of the discussions and the degree to which Hussein had actually been informed of the Sykes-Picot conditions.  The main principles of the agreement, which they had negotiated in relative haste amid the turmoil of the First World War, still influence the region today. But while the sykes-picot lines had just proved considerably useful for Britain and France in the first half of the 20th century, their impact on the peoples of the region was very different. The memorandum was forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and circulated for notice. On 16 January, Sykes informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that he had spoken to Picot and that he thought Paris could agree.
On 21 January, Nicolson convened an inter-departmental conference. Following the meeting, a final draft agreement was circulated to cabinet on February 2 and was reviewed by the War Committee on February 3. Finally, at a meeting on 4th between Bonar Law, Chamberlain, Lord Kitchener and others, it was decided that the formal agreements between Great Britain, France and Russia included the eleven letters below. The Anglo-French declaration was read in the protocol, and Pichon commented that it showed the selfless position of the two governments towards the Arabs and Lloyd George that it was “more important than all the old agreements”.  Pichon mentioned an agreement proposed on 15 February on the basis of the private agreement between Clemenceau and Lloyd George last December.  (According to Lieshout, Clemenceau presented Lloyd George, just before Faisal met at the conference of 6, a proposal that seems to cover the same subject; Lieshout, which issued on British materials related to the 6, while the date is not specified in the minutes. ) Loevy points to the British and French practice of “Ottoman colonial development as an insider” in sections 4 to 8 of the agreement, and that this experience served as a roadmap for subsequent war negotiations.  While Khalidi examined the negotiations of Great Britain and France in 1913 and 1914 on the Homs-Baghdad railway line, as well as their agreements with Germany, in other regions, as a “clear basis” for their subsequent spheres of influence under the agreement.  In the Constantinople Agreement of 18 March 1915, after naval operations began on the eve of the Gallipoli campaign, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov wrote to the French and British ambassadors and claimed Constantinople and the Dardanelles.